's The Spirit Level has become a bestseller since it was first published in Britain last year. It is an ambitious book with a clear message: while economic development in poorer countries contributes substantially to human wellbeing, gains in income in affluent countries count for less and less. This theme is endorsed in a foreword by Robert Reich, former US Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration. Newspapers, commentators, and politicians across the developed world have praised the book and taken its message to heart. However, economists and political scientists in particular tend to be more reluctant to accept the conclusions. Judged on its academic merits, how sound are the authors' arguments?
some desirable feature disappear. Examples include obesity (p. 92-93), aspirations to low-skilled work (p. 116), and homicide frequency (p. 135). Likewise, in other plots such as those between inequality and women's status or foreign aid (pp. 60, 61) , it is apparent that virtually the entire associations are driven by the Scandinavian welfare states. Conversely, a plot on page 21 that seems to show that an index of health and social problems is unrelated to average income suddenly exhibits a clear negative correlation when one hides the US observation.
The Swedish economist Andreas Bergh recently tested question no. 2, the robustness of Wilkinson and Pickett's central claims. Bergh's (2010) starting point is that if inequality affects health, happiness, and other central features of our societies, reductions in inequality ought to result in improvements in those factors. Employing data from the same sources as Wilkinson and Pickett, Bergh shows that once either average income, the number of physicians per 1,000 people, or average calorie intake per day is taken into account, the result that income inequality negatively correlates with life expectancy at birth disappears. Both Bergh's recent work with Therese Nilsson (forthcoming) and Gerring and Thacker's (2008) similar work in political science reach some very different policy implications from those of The Spirit Level when exploring what can be done to improve the health of a population. In general, very few of the conclusions on which this book rests are replicable using econometrics, even when one is not explicitly dealing with the causality issue.
The bottom line is that this is a well-written, stimulating polemic. It nevertheless suffers from the same problems as one-trick ponies: if the one trick does not impress you, the show is a failure. Wilkinson and Pickett's trick simply does not hold up to empirical scrutiny. When assessing this book as a contribution to the debate on the "right" level of income differences in modern society, it is a highly interesting, sympathetic attempt at addressing some of the important problems of Western societies. Yet, when assessing this book from a scientific point of view, one is forced to conclude that it is a failure. When did Americans first begin to consciously limit their family size? Which Americans were they, and what did they hope to accomplish by having smaller families? Susan Klepp offers remarkably specific answers to these questions, especially since she dates "the beginning of the decline at about 1763" (p. 10). She studies the few early American records that can be used to construct age-specific birth rates: 2,800 families that she and five other historians have reconstituted from examining genealogies and church records. She concludes that women in the "revolutionary era" (1760 to 1820) started childbearing later, stopped sooner, and had fewer children than married women in the "colonial era" (1680 to 1780): an urban TFR of 8.6 vs. 9.2, and a rural TFR of 9.0 vs. 9.7. In turn, the TFRs from the "nineteenth-century era" (1800 to 1870) were lower still: an urban TFR of 8.1 and a rural TFR of 8.4. These total fertility rates are notably high since they assume that all women married at age 20 and remained married until 50. Careful estimates by Coale and Zelnik (1963) cited by Klepp (p. 8) set the TFR for the US white population in 1800 at 7.04; their corresponding estimate for 1870 was 4.55.
The reconstituted families include 1,378 families living in rural Lancaster County, 744 families living in Philadelphia, 300 Jewish families living in cities along the eastern seaboard, 219 Quaker families living in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 149 families descended from "wealthy colonial forbearers," and 29 free, Dutch-speaking families of African heritage living in New York and New Jersey. Klepp makes no claims that these families were representative of all American families, but she does use their fertility statistics to date the beginning of "family planning" in America and to contend, quite plausibly, that fertility fell "more rapidly in the East than in the West, in the North than in the South, among city folk before country folk," and among the "middling sorts" before the "very rich" (p. 265).
Although many demographers might find fault with the small non-random sample of Americans that Klepp uses to answer her "when" and "who" questions, they should persevere and read the interesting central chapters of the book, where Klepp answers the "why" question by examining almanacs, novels, letters, diaries, paintings, laws, and medical writings. In these sources Klepp finds evidence that the social and political upheaval brought about by the American Revolution profoundly affected how women thought about themselves, their relationship with their husbands, and their reproductive role. For example, in the political writings and personal letters of Esther Reed, Klepp finds a woman who linked political
